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Abstract
Using Piketty and Zucman’s (Q J Econ 129(3):1255-1310, 2014) recently published
capital share data, this paper uses structural VARs to understand the relationship
between long-term interest rates, capital shares, and the distribution of income in the
United States. The results indicate that increases in capital shares increase income
inequality. Moreover, the relationship between the interest rate and capital shares is
found to be negative and statistically significant. The results suggest that low long-term
rates, through an equity and business investment channel, further increase the unequal
distribution of income in the U.S. The results further illuminate the channels through
which monetary policy can potentially affect the distribution of income.
Keywords Income inequality . Monetary policy . Macroeconomic policy
JEL Classification D31 . E25 . E66

1 Introduction
A country’s ability to increase production of goods and services and experience
economic growth depends on the quantities and productivities of its existing inputs,
such as capital and labor. The formal framework that relates production with the use of
capital and labor was initially developed by Robert Solow in the late 1950s (Solow
(1956)). Since then, the framework known as the Solow model has been widely used to
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understand what makes a country rich or poor. Correspondingly, one of the stylized
facts of the model has been that the shares of production paid to capital and labor are
constant (Kaldor (1957)). In the U.S., about one-third of GDP is paid to capital and
about two-thirds is paid to labor. The literature suggests that these shares have been
reasonably stable over time (Gollin (2002), Jones (2014), p.77).
However, recent studies have documented that the stability of factor shares might
not hold. Particularly, since the early 1980s, labor shares have declined followed by
increases in capital shares. Trade openness, increases in capital mobility, capitalaugmenting technological progress, and decreases in the relative price of investment
goods are some of the factors identified to have contributed to the changing
composition of input shares. Ortega and Rodriguez (2001) document a positive correlation between an economy’s exposure to international trade and capital income shares.
The theory behind their results is that openness has harmed the bargaining power of
labor relative to capital. Guscina (2006) shows that labor’s share of national income
declined over the last two decades. The three factors Guscina uses to explain the
decline in labor shares are factor-biased technological progress, openness to trade,
and changes in employment protection. Guscina finds that, for the post-1980s period,
technological progress has been capital-augmenting, leading to increases in capital
income shares. Openness to trade and increasing trade with developing countries
have harmed labor shares in the industrial countries. Even though labor protection
policies are found to move income toward labor, openness to trade is found to have
dampened this effect. Similarly, Jayadev (2007) documents the decline in labor shares
across many countries over the last two decades. He identifies capital account openness
to have had a significant role in the decline of labor shares. The explanation is that
increases in capital mobility have increased the bargaining strength of capital rather
than labor. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) show that the decline in labor shares has
occurred within most countries and industries. The hypothesis they put forward is that
the efficiency gains in capital producing sectors, such as information technology, have
decreased the relative price of investment goods. As such, a large shift from labor to
capital has occurred, leading to increases in capital income shares. Rodriguez and
Jayadev (2010) document a persistent decline in the labor share across many countries
starting in 1980, which implies that income from capital has been increasing. Similarly,
Piketty and Zucman (2014) show that capital shares have increased in all rich countries
from about 15% - 25% in the 1970s to 25% - 35% in 2010.
Interestingly, the literature seems to have ignored, at the macroeconomic level, the
role of the interest rate in driving the variation in capital income shares. Since capital
investments are typically long-term, it should be expected that economic agents pay
close attention to long-term rates. Figure 1 shows time series’ of capital income shares
and long-term rates. As can be seen, during the years prior to the 1960s, long-term rates
were below 4% and capital income shares were roughly 23%. As long-term rates start
to increase, capital income shares begin to decrease. After the 1980s, long-term rates
show a secular decline, followed by increases in capital income shares. The negative
association between long-term rates and capital shares is also documented in Fig. 2. As
shown, with increases in long-term rates, capital shares tend to decrease. This paper
adds to the existing literature by empirically testing the significance of how long-term
rates influence changes in capital income shares in the U.S. The intuition is that low
interest rates drive households, particularly high earning households, to shift from
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Fig. 1 Time variation of long-term rates and capital shares

interest bearing securities to equities. This shift increases income attributed to capital
and drives up income inequality.
Given that capital income is more unequally distributed than labor income (Solow
(2014), Bengtsson and Waldenstrom (2015), Milanovic (2015)), we also examine how
long-term rates and capital shares might affect the distribution of income. The insight is
that a more intensive application of capital due to declines in long-term rates increases
the income share of capital over time, leading to increases in income inequality. The
relationship is examined in a dynamic setting after controlling for openness to trade. To
estimate the dynamic relationship across the variables of interest, impulse responses
from a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) are utilized. Additionally, we estimate
variance decompositions to extract the contribution of each variable to the variation of
the other variables. To preview, the results show that capital shares benefit from
decreases in long-term rates. Income inequality responds positively to increases in
capital shares and to drops in long term-rates. The results are consistent across two
measures of income inequality and three specifications of capital shares. We believe
this adds to past literature as we reinforce prior work, such as Milanovic (2015), which
shows that increasing capital’s share of income leads to higher income inequality. The
paper also adds to the empirical evidence regarding how long-term rates affect capital’s
share of income.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 discusses our data and method,
section 3 presents our results, and section 4 concludes.

Fig. 2 Correlation of long-term rates and capital shares
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2 Top Income Earners and the Sources of Household Income
Understanding how households at different levels of the income distribution earn their
income allows for a better understanding behind our use of income inequality measures
that capture top income shares. Also, it highlights the mechanism through which longterm rates and capital shares drive changes in income inequality. Figure 3 shows that, in
the U.S., the dynamics of income inequality are driven by the income share variation of
the households at the upper end of the income distribution. The B10% - 1%^ income
group captures the income shares of the top decile, excluding the top 1%. Note that we
do not see large changes in the income share of this group over time. The B10%–1%^
share increased from 24.6% in 1980 to 26.2% in 2007. On the other hand, the income
share of the top 1% increased from 10.0% to 23.5% over the same period. Within the
top 1% group, it is the top 0.1% that has experienced the biggest increase in income.
Their income share has almost quadrupled, from 3.4% in 1980 to 12.3% in 2007.
Figure 4 shows the relevance of wages as a source of income for the top 0.1%, the
top 1%, and bottom 90% of income earners. For the bottom 90% group, approximately
80% of their income comes from wages. This has been consistent since 1989. On the
other hand, more than 40% of income for the top 1% group and more than 50% of
income for the top 0.1% group is from non-wage sources. One important non-wage
source is income from entrepreneurial activities. Figure 5 shows that entrepreneurial
activities provide 20% of income for the top 1% group and 30% of income for the top
0.1% group. However, for the bottom 90%, only 5% of income comes from entrepreneurial activities. Another non-wage source of income is capital income. Figure 6
shows that, for the top 1% group, income from capital increased from 30% to
approximately 40% of total income within the last 30 years. Interestingly, income from
capital has been negative for the households in the bottom 50% and 10% groups. This
suggests that the amount of income these households have allocated to servicing their
debt exceeds the amount of income from housing assets, equity assets, interest,
pensions, and social insurance.
Thus, differences in income sources among the households at various levels of the
income distribution is the mechanism through which we believe long-term rates and
capital shares are affecting the top income households differently than lower income

Fig. 3 Top income shares. Notes: Top 10% - 1% represents the income shares of the top decile excluding the
top 1% group. Top 1% - 0.1% represents the income shares of the top centile excluding the top 0.1% group
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Fig. 4 Income from wages

households. Specifically, the inverse link between the long-term rates and capital
shares, followed by increases in income inequality, is driven by the fact that the top
income groups earn significantly more of their income and hold more of their wealth in
equities. Additionally, if the interest rate is low, this may encourage wealthier
households to put even more money into stocks, which will lead to increases in
equity asset income and further exacerbate inequality. These findings are supported
by Owyang and Shell (2016) who highlight that wealthy households own most equities
in the United States and, thus, increases in the stock market disproportionately benefit
high income families. Similarly, Milanovic (2015) states that capital ownership is
mainly concentrated within the households at the top end of the income distribution.
As long-term rates decrease, we expect the top earning households to shift from interest

Fig. 5 Income from entrepreneurship
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Fig. 6 Pre-tax capital income. Note: Capital Income = Housing asset income + Equity asset income + Interest
income + Pensions and social insurance income-Interest payments

bearing securities to equities to seek higher returns. As top earning households hold the
vast majority of stocks, this shift is expected to increase income inequality.
Further, Coibion et al. (2012) define several channels through which monetary
policy may affect income inequality. The income composition channel indicates that,
for many households, wages are the main source of income; whereas, high-income
households earn income from business and financial gains. As interest rates fall, profits
will increase by more than labor earnings leading to a larger benefit for the owners of
firms (upper-income households). The financial segmentation channel infers that low
interest rates increase asset prices, benefiting owners of the financial assets (upperincome households), which exacerbates income inequality. The portfolio channel
suggests that differences in the structure of assets owned by households in different
parts of the income distribution is another mechanism through which the interest rate
can impact the distribution of income. Particularly, low-income earners hold more
currency; whereas, upper-income households own various securities. In general, low
interest rates feed into higher prices and booms in financial markets, which will benefit
upper-income households and harm lower-income households. During the recent
financial crisis, higher income households lost relatively more, but they quickly made
up their losses; whereas, lower income households have not really recovered. As
mentioned in the introduction, our results show that low interest rates may act through
these channels and exacerbate income inequality (although we cannot point to a
specific channel due to the aggregate nature of our data).
The channels described by Coibion et al. (2012) and Owyang and Shell (2016) are
also readily apparent in further data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
gathered by Kuhn and Rios-Rull (2016). The income data they use includes almost all
before-tax income for families. Appendix A in Kuhn and Rios-Rull’s paper lists the full
set of income generating items they use to construct their income data. The data shows
the top 1% of earners do earn most of their income from labor. However, note that these
households receive about 25% of their income from capital and about 30% of their
income from business ownership. For the middle quintile, these households earn about
2/3rds of their income from labor, substantially more than for the top 1% of earners.
The other large source of income for these households are transfer payments, which
contribute about 25% of income. Bottom earners receive about 30% of their income
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from labor. The biggest contributor for these lowest earning households are transfer
payments, contributing roughly 60% of these households’ income.
As described above, there are clear and significant differences between low and
high-income households. Namely, high-income households receive about 55% of their
income from capital and business sources compared to almost none for the bottom 20%
of earners and little for middle-income earners. Labor income is most important for the
middle-income households and contributes about equal amounts to the top 1% of
earners and the bottom 20% of earners. Transfer payments are, not surprisingly, the
most important income source for the poorest households. It is clear, based on the data
from the SCF collected by Kuhn and Rios-Rull, that monetary policy can affect the
distribution of income. In particular, if low interest rates boost asset prices and profits
from business holdings, this will primarily benefit top households as they earn a large
portion of their income from these sources. On the other hand, low and middle-income
households benefit very little from increases in asset prices or profits as they earn little
of their income from either capital or business sources.

3 Data and Method
3.1 Data
We use data spanning from 1929 to 2009 which includes key historical periods, such as
the Great Depression era, and the 1950s and 1960s where capital income shares were
relatively stable. During the 1950s and 1960s, long-term rates and income inequality
were quite low. The capital share measures are from Piketty and Zucman (2014).
Domestic capital is defined as the sum of agricultural land, housing, and other domestic
capital (including the market value of corporations and the value of other nonfinancial
assets held by the private and public sectors net of their liabilities). The capital share is
equal to the output produced by domestic capital divided by total output.1 The data
source for the measures (domestic capital and output) are balance sheet data prepared by
national statistical institutes and central banks. The concepts used to calculate the
measures strictly follow the U.N. System of National Accounts (SNA). Piketty and
Zucman (2014) report three different specifications of capital shares: the capital share
including the government interest rate, the capital share excluding the government
interest rate, and the after-tax capital share. All three specifications are used in this paper.
For the long-term rate variable, the 10-year government bond rate from Robert
Shiller’s website is used. Trade openness is calculated as the sum of U.S. imports and
exports divided by U.S. GDP and the data are from the FRED Database. The annual
data used for the measures of income inequality were obtained from The World
Inequality Database due to its long time series. The measures used from the database
are the inverted Pareto coefficient (IPAR) and the Top 1% income share. IPAR captures
income inequality within the top end of the income distribution (specifically within the
top 1 and 0.1% of earners) and Top 1% captures the income share of the households in
the top 1% of the income distribution. Intuitively, as the measures increase, income is
less equally distributed. The top income shares are based on tax returns data published
1

The output and capital share series are net of depreciation.
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by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The income definition used in the construction
of the measures is a gross income definition including all the income items reported on
tax returns (prior to deductions): salaries and wages, small business and farm income,
partnership and fiduciary income, dividends, interest, rents, royalties, and other small
items reported as other income. Then, the income shares are estimated by dividing the
income amounts accruing to each top fractile by total personal income computed from
the National Accounts. Since capital share data might be correlated with capital gains,
we use the calculated top income shares excluding realized capital gains.
3.2 Method
We set up a four-variable autoregressive model in the vector zt ¼ ðtot it csht ineqt Þ0,
, it represents the
where tot denotes the change in trade openness measured as ExportsþImports
GDP
change in the10-year Treasury maturity rate, csht signifies the growth rate in capital income
shares, and ineqt captures the growth rate in income inequality.
To capture the linear interdependencies that may exist among the four variables, the
following structural VAR model is estimated:
A0 zt ¼ α þ ∑ni¼1 Ai zt−i þ εt

ð1Þ

where εt represents a vector of structural innovations and is estimated based on the
innovations from the reduced-form representation of (1), which is given by:

(2)
where et denotes a vector of possibly contemporaneously correlated innovations from
the reduced form. v and Bi are the intercept and the slope of the reduced-form VAR. OLS


^ ¼ ^v B^1 …B
^ n and the innovacan be applied to estimate the matrix coefficients B
tions, e^t : By definition et ¼ A−1
0 εt , which indicates that the reduced form innovations, et,
are a weighted average of the structural shocks εt. The knowledge of A−1
0 would enable
us to get εt from εt = A0et and Ai = A0Bi. To identify the elements of the unknown matrix
A−1
0 , the covariance matrix of reduced form innovations is utilized as follows:
 0
 0
0
E
εt εt A−1
E et et ¼ A−1
0
0
−1
Σe ¼ A−1
0 Σu A0
−1
Σe ¼ A−1
0 A0

0

0

ð3Þ
ð4Þ
ð5Þ

In the last step, the diagonal entries of the covariance matrix of structural shocks are
0

−1
as a system of equations in the
normalized to 1. We can think of Σe ¼ A−1
0 A0
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unknown parameters of A−1
0 . Since Σe can be estimated, it is treated as known. As such,
the system of equations can be solved for the unknown parameters of A−1
0 . Because Σe
is a (4 × 4) symmetric matrix, to identify the structural innovations εt from the reducedÞ
−1
form innovations, k ðk−1
2 restrictions in A0 need to be imposed (Kilian (2011), Guentner
(2014)). Recursive ordering, which leads to 6 restrictions, is imposed on A−1
0 . The
vector of structural shocks, εt, is identified by decomposing the reduced-form errors in
et as follows:
0
B
B
@

1 2
3
eto
0
0
a11 0
t
i
C
et
0 7
a21 a22 0
C¼6
5
A 4 a31 a32 a33
0
ecsh
t
ineq
a41 a42 a43 a44
et
0
openness shock
εtrade
t
long−term
rate shock
B
εt
B
capital
share
shock
@
εt
income inequality shock
εt

1
C
C
A

ð6Þ

The recursive ordering in (Gollin 2002) hypothesizes that a shock to openness to trade
(tot) influences each of the dependent variables contemporaneously, while a shock to
income inequality (ineqt) affects only itself contemporaneously. The rationale for this
ordering is based on the following considerations. tot is placed first because openness to
trade depends on multilaterally agreed rules among countries. it is placed second under
the assumption that openness to trade affects macroeconomic volatility, which will lead
to variations in long-term rates. Capital share and income inequality are placed last in
the ordering under the assumption that trade openness and changes in long-term rates
influence changes in the share of income attributed to capital and overall changes in the
income distribution.

4 Results
4.1 Impulse Response Functions
For ease of exposition, we standardized and cumulated the impulse responses.2 Figures 7, 8, 9 and 10 display the impulse responses from estimating Eq. 1 using two
measures of income inequality and the specification of capital shares that excludes the
government interest rate.3 The figures show the response of the variable listed at the
bottom (“Responses of...”) to the variable listed above each box.
Figures 7 and 8 display impulse responses using Top 1% and IPAR as the income
inequality measures. In close correspondence with the literature, the results suggest that
openness to trade leads to subsequent changes in income inequality. Particularly, a
2

Using the Akaike Information Criterion, a one-year lag is used to estimate Model 1.
Since the results are consistent across the three specifications of capital shares, we only report the results for
the capital share specification that excludes the government interest rate. Results for capital share specifications that include the government interest rate and adjust for taxes are available upon request.

3

628

Berisha E., Meszaros J.

Fig. 7 Impulse Responses of Income Inequality using Top 1% as the income inequality measure. Note: The
solid lines represent the impulse responses of the income inequality measure to a 1 standard deviation shock of
each of the 4 variables (including its own shock). Dotted lines are 95% confidence bands using 10,000
replications in a Monte Carlo simulation

positive one standard deviation shock to trade openness has a statistically significant,
positive impact on income inequality which is approximately 0.5 standard deviations
for the Top 1% measure and 0.25 standard deviations for the IPAR measure. Note,
various free trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and
the Transatlantic Free Trade Area, have increased trade between the U.S and the rest of
the world, which seems to have contributed to higher income inequality in the U.S. In
addition, a positive one standard deviation shock to the interest rate has a statistically
significant, negative impact on income inequality, which is approximately 0.5 standard
deviations after five years for the Top 1% measure and 0.4 standard deviations for the
IPAR measure. This indicates that low long-term rates benefit households at the top end
of the income distribution. This is no surprise since high income earners have a higher
interest rate elasticity of income than those at the bottom of the income distribution.
Particularly, low long-term rates may have helped high-income earners to further

Fig. 8 Impulse Responses of Income Inequality using IPAR as the income inequality measure. Note: The solid
lines represent the impulse responses of the income inequality measure to a 1 standard deviation shock of each
of the 4 variables (including its own shock). Dotted lines are 95% confidence bands using 10,000 replications
in a Monte Carlo simulation
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Fig. 9 Impulse Responses of Capital Shares using Top 1% as the income inequality measure. Note: The solid
lines represent the impulse responses of the capital share measure to a 1 standard deviation shock of each of
the 4 variables (including its own shock). Dotted lines are 95% confidence bands using 10,000 replications in a
Monte Carlo simulation

expand their entrepreneurial activities and invest in financial markets, which has led to
increases in their income share.
Note, drops in long-term interest rates may not be the result of any specific central
bank policy. Over longer horizons, such as a decade or more, interest rates are mainly
influenced by changes in spending and saving in the world as a whole (King (2017),
p.28). Countries, such as the United States, were faced with structural trade deficits
(excess of imports over exports) which created a continuous negative drag on demand.
To ensure total demand (domestic demand minus the trade deficit) matched the capacity
of the U.S. economy to produce, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates to boost
domestic demand (King (2017), p.47). Thus, decreases in long-term rates in the U.S.,
over the last 30 years, have been used to create incentives to bring spending forward
from the future to the present and the benefits seem to have been very unequally
distributed. Another plausible factor that might drive the negative association between
long-term rates and income inequality is the inflation rate. As presented by Doepke
et al. (2015), low interest rates reflect low rates of inflation, which mainly helps savers
(households at the top of the income distribution) and harms debt holders (households

Fig. 10 Impulse Responses of Capital Shares using IPAR as the income inequality measure. Note: The solid
lines represent the impulse responses of the capital share measure to a 1 standard deviation shock of each of
the 4 variables (including its own shock). Dotted lines are 95% confidence bands using 10,000 replications in a
Monte Carlo simulation
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in the middle and at the bottom of the income distribution). Interestingly, the results
indicate that income inequality responds positively to its own shocks. This suggests that
a person’s initial income level matters for future economic success. If a person is born
into an economically disadvantaged environment, he or she is expected to fall behind in
terms of income mobility. Or, if an individual is born a Bwinner^, he or she can be
expected to do well in the future.
From Figs. 9 and 10, it can be seen that the capital share has a statistically significant
effect on the two measures of income inequality. Per one standard deviation increase in
the capital share, the income inequality measures increase by roughly 0.25 standard
deviations (although only the top 1% results are statistically significant). The results are
stronger when capital shares are adjusted for taxes. The results show supporting
evidence that forces that are shown to contribute to higher capital shares, such as trade
openness, capital-augmenting technological progress, lower capital-gains taxes, and
decreases in relative prices of investment goods have led to higher income inequality in
the U.S. Also, the results show strong supporting evidence that long term-rates matter
for changes in capital shares. Particularly, increases in long-term rates have an adverse
effect on the share of income attributed to capital. This suggests that capital shares
benefit from loose monetary policy. The findings are consistent across the three
specifications of capital shares. Thus, it can be said that there is a capital share channel
through which the interest rate can drive changes in income inequality. The results hold
even after we control for overall economic conditions by including the growth rate in
real GDP in Model 1. Figures 11 and 12 show the results for both income inequality
measures. Looking at the last row and column 3, we can see that, across both income
inequality measures, economic growth leads to lower income inequality. All the other
results are similar to the earlier findings.
Also, the Federal Reserve, to minimize the negative impact of the financial crisis on
the economic and financial stability of the U.S. economy, responded strongly by

Fig. 11 Impulse Responses of all five variables using Top 1% as the income inequality measure including real
GDP. Note: The rows represent variable responses and the columns represent variable shocks. The solid lines
represent the impulse responses of the responding variable to a 1 standard deviation shock of each of the 5
variables (including its own shock). Dotted lines are 95% confidence bands using 10,000 replications in a
Monte Carlo simulation
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Fig. 12 Impulse Responses of all 5 variables using IPAR as the income inequality measure including real
GDP. Note: The rows represent variable responses and the columns represent variable shocks. The solid lines
represent the impulse responses of the responding variable to a 1 standard deviation shock of each of the 5
variables (including its own shock). Dotted lines are 95% confidence bands using 10,000 replications in a
Monte Carlo simulation

reducing the federal funds rate to zero and by implementing large-scale asset purchases
(LSAPs), also known as quantitative easing (QE). While it is true that QE can act as a
signal about future monetary policy, the main aim was to lower the long-end of the
yield curve, and thus, stimulate the economy through a different channel. The main tool
that the Fed used to signal the policy rate (federal funds rate) would remain low was
forward guidance. (Weale and Wieladek (2016), Bernanke (2017, pg. 418)). Due to
data availability, we are not able to include the QE period. We believe that, through the
equity channel, QE has likely contributed positively to the share of total income

Fig. 13 Income sources of the top 1% and bottom 50% as a fraction of national income
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Fig. 14 Variance decompositions using top 1% as the income inequality measure

attributed to capital and further increased income inequality in the U.S. All else equal,
low long-term rates decrease the discount rate. This leads to an increase in the present
value of future cash flows, which increase the price of financial assets.4 Also, low longterm rates directly increase corporate profits through lower debt-service payments,
which would add to higher equity prices. From Fig. 13, income from financial assets
has increased since the end of the Great Recession and the benefits are concentrated
among the households in the top 1% of the income distribution. However, for the
bottom 50%, these sources of income have been zero and, from some financial
instruments, income has even been negative.
4.2 Variance Decompositions
To further understand the effect of long-term rates on capital shares and income
inequality, we also estimate the forecast error variance decompositions. Note, the one
standard deviation impulse response function in Eq. 1 gives the conditional mean of the
distribution of zt. The variance decomposition is concerned with the conditional
variance of the impulse responses. Particularly, variance decomposition separates the
variation of the variable of interest into the shocks of other variables in the VAR. For
instance, forecast error variance decompositions for income inequality inform us about
the amount of variation in income inequality that is attributed to the shocks to trade
openness, long-term rates, capital shares, and its own shocks.
Again, since the findings are similar across the three specifications of capital shares,
we only report the results for the capital share specification that excludes the
4

Bhattarai and Neely (2016) review empirical studies on the effects of U.S. unconventional monetary policy
on both financial markets and the real economy. They claim that unconventional policies have had strong
impacts on domestic and international asset prices and have been successful in averting deflation and output
collapse.
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Fig. 15 Variance decompositions using IPAR as the income inequality measure

government interest rate. Figure 14 displays the variance decompositions using Top 1%
as the income inequality measure. The last bar in the figure displays the contribution of
the variation in income inequality explained by the other variables in the model. As can
be seen, 6% of the variation in income inequality is attributed to the long-term rate, 5%
is attributed to the capital share, and 10% is attributed to openness to trade. Overall,
approximately 22% of the variation in income inequality represented by the Top 1%
measure is explained by these 3 variables. In addition, 10% of the variation in capital
shares is driven by the long-term rate and roughly 7% by openness to trade.
Figure 15 displays the variance decompositions using IPAR as the income inequality
measure. Around 15% of the variation in income inequality is attributed to the other
three variables in the VAR with 3% attributed to the capital share, 7% attributed to the
long-term rate, and 5% attributed to trade openness. The results again confirm that
long-term rates matter for the variation (11%) in capital shares. Also, 7% of the
variation in capital shares is attributed to trade openness.5 Overall, the results reveal
that changes in long-term rates play a role in driving the variation in capital shares and
income inequality.

5 Conclusion
In the past, the returns to capital and labor were viewed as relatively constant (Kaldor
(1957)). However, this relationship has not held into the present. Past literature has
attributed at least part of the change in capital’s share of income to international trade
and international capital mobility (Ortega and Rodriguez (2001), Jayadev (2007),
5

Note, the analysis includes growth rates of variables and it is standard not to get larger numbers on variance
decompositions from the contributions of other variables.
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Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014)). As trade across the world has increased and capital
has become more mobile, this has factored into a substantial increase in capital’s share
of income as documented by Piketty and Zucman (2014). Interestingly, past studies
have paid relatively little attention to the effect of interest rates on capital shares and
income inequality. As capital income is more unequally distributed than labor income
(Solow (2014), Bengtsson and Waldenstrom (2015), Milanovic (2015)), it seems likely
that interest rates may then affect both capital shares and income inequality. We show
this difference in how high and low-income households earn their respective incomes
in-depth in section 2. There is a clear distinction between high-income households
(high level of business and capital income) and lower-earning households (labor and
transfer income dominate). Thus, it is not a surprise that interest rates may have
different effects on different parts of the income distribution.
Namely, we show that, controlling for the effects of trade, decreases in long-term
interest rates tend to directly increase income inequality. We argue this is largely due to
how households earn their income: low-income households mainly get income from
labor and transfers while high-income households earn from capital and business
ownership. Low interest rates likely benefit high-income households as the low rates
may allow them to invest in their own entrepreneurial activities or invest at lower cost
in the stock market. Since lower income households have little exposure to capital or
business ventures, the boost for the high-income households then increases income
disparities. Further, our results show that increases in capital’s share of income
increases income inequality. This, again, is not shocking given the differences in how
low and high-income households earn their income. Namely, high-income households
receive a substantial portion of their income from capital; whereas, low and middleincome households do not. Also, our results show that low long-term rates boost capital
income shares. These increases in capital shares then feed into further increases in
income inequality. In summary, our results show that interest rates affect income
inequality directly and also through the interest rate effect on capital shares. These
results, taken together, show that loose monetary policy can further increase income
disparities.
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